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Despite broad skepticism about the benefits of globalization, the majority of U.S. states 
have offered lucrative tax incentives to attract investment.1  The size of these incentives is 
generally considered too large to be welfare enhancing, and many economists are skeptical of the 
effectiveness of these policies. Yet despite the mounting evidence to the contrary, the incentives 
offered by U.S. states (and foreign countries) continue and have actually increased in their 
generosity over time.  
In the fall of 2009, we sought to solve this puzzle by conducting an internet survey of 
2,000 Americans as part of a Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) project. In this 
survey, we included questions to assess how individuals feel about FDI and the individuals’ 
efforts to hold politicians accountable for its attraction.2  Our central finding is that politicians can 
use tax incentives to take credit for investment flowing into their district, or deflect blame for 
losing the competition for mobile firms. Thus, fiscal incentives, while economically inefficient, 
may be a useful tool for politicians to win reelection.   
Our first question in the survey asked, “In recent years  ____ companies have invested in 
the United States. Do you think these investments are good for the U.S. economy?”  One-third of 
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the respondents had the above blank filled in with the word “foreign,” one-third with “Japanese,” 
and one-third with “Chinese.”  When asked about foreign companies, the majority of respondents 
(55%) indicated that these investments are good for the U.S. economy. A sizable percentage 
disagreed (22%) or answered “don’t know” (23%). Support for investment increased when asked 
about Japanese investment, where 61% of the respondents answered “yes,” and the remainder 
answered “no” (18%) and “don’t know” (21%). This support plummeted to only 35% when asked 
about Chinese investment, with 45% answering “no” and 20% “don’t know.” 
These survey results reveal mixed support for FDI with sizeable minorities either 
skeptical or uncertain of its benefits. When asked about Chinese investment, the skeptics 
outnumber the supporters, likely due the perception of China as our closest foreign competitor. 
We imagine that a similar survey in the 1980s may have found skepticism toward Japanese 
investment, when Japan was seen as our closest rival. 
A second set of questions3 asked citizens about their voting intentions for governor. 
While many factors affect voting for governor, attracting investment (foreign or domestic) has 
become central to many governors’ economic development strategies. We asked respondents to 
imagine a 1,000-job manufacturing facility either choosing to locate in the respondent’s state or 
in another state, and how this affected voting intentions for the governor. 
Our results were striking. The attraction of investment, without knowing the firm-specific 
reasons for the location decision, led 20.9% more respondents to say they would vote for the 
incumbent governor than in states that did not receive the investment, after controlling for 
individual and state determinants. This was especially apparent for independent voters (23.6%), 
whereas partisan voters (strong Democrats or Republicans) were less swayed by this information.   
 We also provided information on tax incentives, asking respondents to consider a 
situation in which the state provided either above-average or below-average incentive packages.  
Again, our findings were clear. For states that received the investment project, the governor 
received an additional 5.6 percentage-point vote bonus for offering tax incentives from 
independents. This bears repeating. Independent voters preferred governors that provided tax 
incentives to attract investment to governors who received investment without offering generous 
tax incentives. 
 When states “lost” our hypothetical investment project, the contrast was even clearer. 
Governors who did not receive the investment were always worse off than governors from states 
who attracted the investment, but the “punishment” was much less severe if tax incentives were 
offered. Put another way, if you are a governor of a state and are certain that a firm is going to 
locate within your borders, offering a tax incentive gets you an extra 5.6 percentage points of 
votes from independent voters. Go ahead and take credit for the investment.  If you know your 
state is going to lose the project, the decision is easier still. Offering the tax incentives provides 
an extra 5.3 percentage points of all votes and 11.2 percentage points of independents. “It’s not 
my fault, we offered them tax incentives!” 
 The findings from the survey indicate two clear points related to public policy. First, the 
tax wars among states, and possibly among countries, are strongly driven by domestic politics. 
Politicians may be trying to take credit for investment that is going to come anyway and/or trying 
to minimize blame for investment that does not come. Even without any tax competition, 
politicians may be taking advantage of voters’ perceptions (or misperceptions) of competition. 
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 Second, despite some popular rhetoric against FDI, and specifically Chinese FDI, we find 
strong evidence that there are massive political benefits to attracting FDI.4  Although many voters 
are skeptical of its benefits nationally, they clearly reward politicians for attracting investment to 
their state.  
Congressional pollsters have noticed a strange pattern over time. While nobody seems to 
like the institution of Congress or incompetent politicians, survey data (and the 90% reelection 
rate) suggest that voters like their members of Congress. Our findings point to an interesting 
parallel with the perceptions of Americans on FDI: there is some skepticism of the benefits of 
FDI, unless it is creating jobs in their state. 
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a Results from all voters, sample size 1,944. “In recent years [foreign], [Chinese], [Japanese], companies 
have invested in the United States. Do you think these investments are good for the U.S. Economy?” 
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a Results from independent voters, sample size 453. Horizontal Access likelihood of voters changing 
support for Governor from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely).      
